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Tragedia na Przełęczy Diatłowa (1/2 luty 1959 r.)


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#1001 fortyck

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Napisano 08 listopad 2018 - 22:54

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«My opinion is that there are no mysteries in the case of the death of Dyatlov group»
Sergey Shkryabach, a veteran of the investigating authorities and a mountaineer, commented on the air of Radio Komsomolskaya Pravda his opinion on the results of the inspection of the Russian IC of the case of the tragic death of a group of tourists led by Igor Dyatlov in the Urals in 1959
All rights belong to Komsomolskaya Pravda.
Authors Nikolay Varsegov, Vladimir Sungorkin, Natalya Varsegova and Ramil Farzutdinov
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Veteran of the investigating authorities and mountaineer Sergey Shkryabach. Photo: Personal Archive
Recall that in the winter of 1959 in the mountains of the Northern Ural nine tourists disappeared, who went hiking under the guidance of Igor Dyatlov.
A month later, rescuers discovered their cut tent.
And within a radius of one and a half kilometers from it - five frozen bodies.
The corpses of the rest were found only in May.
Almost all the tourists were barefoot and half-dressed.
Some had fatal injuries.
It is still not solved why the hikers ran away to the bitter cold and their doom.
According to the former investigator for particularly important cases and the head of the investigative units of various levels, Sergey Shkryabach, Dyatlov’s group died because in the storm the tourists chose an unsuitable place to stay for the night and made a camp, having dug deep into the snow on the mountainside.
As a result, an avalanche descended into a landslide covered their tent.
In a hurry after leaving it in a gale and strong frost, all members of the group died.
Sergey Shkryabach came to our studio radio "Komsomolskaya Pravda" (97.2) to talk more about this tragedy.
THE INVESTIGATION WAS DOING BABY STEPS
– Sergey Yakovlevich, we have been dealing with the history of the Dyatlov Pass for three years already.
And during this time we have not formed a specific version of what happened.
We read your conclusion and wanted to discuss this story with you, as an expert and a climber.
In the case of the avalanche, it is not entirely clear why they ran so far from the tent (1.5 km, - Ed.)? Could stay in place and dig up the tent.
– They fled to the forest because it was the only way out for them.
The same thing, probably, we would have done with you in order to survive in this storm.
It was necessary to create some conditions.
At least a fire.
On the slope blown they would not have lit.
They did not know exactly how far the forest was, since they actually had no map.
I studied this question.
The exact maps of the General Staff at that time were classified.
They had some forestry maps.
But this is not serious.
– This, by the way, completely breaks the spyware version.
If the KGB had sent tourists to the mountains, they would have a decent map.
– This was the first ascent.
They followed a route that was not known.
Therefore, when they jumped out of the tent, they intuitively went down, not knowing that there were three stone ridges and icing there.
Their movement was very heavy.
Many had minor injuries.
They did not even reach the forest, stopping at a lone cedar.
Severe frost, wind, they are half-dressed ...
For more than two hours no one could stretch under such conditions.
– Three of them were very well dressed.
That is the question.
– No, it was they who later dressed, taking off their clothes from the dead Doroshenko and Krivonischenko.
THEY DIDN'T STAND A CHANCE
– And why did they climb cedar?
– For firewood.
– We all know very well that in life we will not climb on any cedar behind the branches when it is full of dry wood.
– Nothing like this.
There was nothing there.
Cedar alone stood.
There you can see even by photos.
And they needed a fire.
– There were twigs, dry wood, fir branches.
They covered the flooring with it.
– Not them.
This is the last four that went further into the ravine.
– It is known that in the fire were quite thick branches.
One even burned out.
Why they did not maintain the fire?
– How it really happened there, I do not know.
By itself, the fire will not save from the cold, if you do not create conditions.
– Dig a den?
– At least.
– We assume that there was a snowstorm.
But the corpses in relation to the tent lay in a straight line.
As if they saw a tent.
– Not. They just walked down the slope.
And about the same direction they tried to go back..
– In its wake?
Why was the end of the tent open?
The horse was visible.
– From the tent down were protruding tracks.
These columns were due to the fact that the wind blew a layer of snow about 40 cm thick around the tracks pressed by the feet.
This means that the tent also initially had about as much snow, which was also boldly blown away.
THE MILITARY HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS
– Some of your colleagues are surprised that the case was closed at the end of May, when even the snow did not come down in those places.
Why did the investigation turn so sloppy?
– I tell you as a practitioner, as an investigator I explain that there are situations when the prosecutor sees that you will not find anything in this matter, but there is a stir around him.
And he stops the case.
Although then it was impossible to do.
Yes, Ivanov was a competent investigator, but he did not involve people who understand something in extreme situations, avalanches, into the investigation.
He did not even collect weather information.
– You say that Ivanov did not attract any specialists.
But Sverdlovsk athletes Maslennikov and Akselrod, and representatives of the Moscow Tourism Federation worked on the scene.
– Specialists arrived at the site when the tent was already excavated. Everybody, including Maslennikov.
Therefore, they did not understand the situation.
The entire slope was trampled by this time.
– Why did they have to bring mountaineers from Moscow?
– Because the consent to go ahead with this expedition was issued by the regional tourism federation.
So they had to figure what went wrong with it.
– Why did they submit their report to the CPSU Central Committee?
– Sorry, nine people died! And one takes responsibility for this.
The Central Committee, most likely, received many complaints.
So the Committee requested information.
– Military was greatly involved in the search.
There is a version that they were called because the death of tourists is the fault of some military department.
– This is not true.
Where else to get so many people to search?
You need to bring the military.
So they combed the whole huge slope.
INVESTIGATORS WERE AMATEURS
– There is an opinion that the existing criminal case is a fake, and the real one lies somewhere else.
– You can think what you want.
– So the lack of professionalism of the investigation played a significant role?
– The investigation simply approached the situation amateurishly.
Prosecutors saw the tent, which was already excavated, and began to draw conclusions based on what they saw.
(The snow on the tent was really raked, the search engines Slobtsov and Sharavin cut down with an ice pick, - ed. note).
You shouldn't do that.
– Sergey Yakovlevich, have you been surprised that there are not many procedural documents in the case?
For example, protocols on the decision of a forensic medical examination.
– There were documents, they just did not arrive at the right time.
Sometimes they were not fastened properly, but they were there.
– What do you think about the opening date of the case - February 6, 1959?
(This date is indicated on the cover, and the protocol of initiation of a criminal case of February 26, 1959, - ed. note).
– Sometimes investigators make mistakes.
I had a situation when I interrogated an assassin per hire, it was Sunday.
But I questioned him on Saturday.
The case came to court, only there could I see the confusion with the dates.
INJURIES – FROM SNOW AND RADIATION – FROM FACTORIES
– Many forensic pathologists are surprised by the nature of the injuries on the hikers bodies.
– You mean those found in the creek?
As a specialist in murder cases, I will say that a bilateral fracture is a result of pressure.
According to the forensic report, there are no point marks of blows and hemorrhages on the bodies.
This suggests that there was a wide area of the application.
Such damage can occur from pressuring with great force.
– And where did they get these injuries?
– They were found at the source of the Lozva tributary.
In a place that does not freeze completely.
It is covered with snow first, then the snow melts and freezes, and the water below remains running.
As in any river. And there was a grotto, over which accumulated a lot of snow and ice.
Hikers decided to hide from the cold in this place (not knowing that there is a grotto under them).
They made the flooring, brought some clothes there, the vault of the grotto collapsed and the four of them collapsed down.
They covered almost 5-meter layer of snow and ice.
Hence the injuries.
– Why testing for radiation then?
– They tried to find out maybe some data.
They thought that something else had happened, and not an avalanche.
Investigator Ivanov had a poor understanding of the mechanism of this investigation.
He was not on the pass at the time of the excavation of the tent, Ivdel prosecutor wasn't present either.
He arrived only two days later.
– But radiation was found!
– radiation was found on the clothes of tourists who worked in closed factories.
That is, perhaps, they brought it to the pass from the factories.
YOU CAN CHECK THE COUNT ON THE SPOT
– Tourists, unfortunately, died and die often. But why such an interest in this story?
– The whole problem lies in the fact that the investigator made a vague decision on the case with the formulation of elemental force.
Intuitively, he was right, because it is an overwhelming natural force, but he did not have proof.
Did not carry out the analysis.
This is where so many versions came from and people are still puzzled over various theories.
And the only most clear-cut version of the development of events is what I have outlined.
Everything else is mystification.
There were no traces of unauthorized persons at the scene of the incident, traces of fire, explosion - nothing like that was found.
– In your opinion, should the case be reopened?
– No.
To reopen a case one needs newly discovered specific circumstances.
And we do not have that.
– What about exhumation?
– In this case, we can only see the nature of the fractures.
And that's all.
This procedure will lead to nothing more.
– Anyway, we have a feeling that there is some kind of mystery.
– For many years I worked as an investigator and investigated so many different situations, criminal cases, that I clearly know that very often everything is much simpler than we initially think, and everything ultimately yields to logical judgment.
There is no mystery in this matter.
You can, of course, conduct an investigative experiment - estimate the territory, based on the materials of the case, roughly outline where the tent was, see the structure of this place, the nature of the rocks, snow cover, intensity and direction of the winds, as well as simulate the mechanism and sequence of movement of each member of the group.
And as a result, analyze the situation together with specialists who can be drawn from various structures, including the Emergency Ministry Tsentrospasa.
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Żródło: https://www.facebook.com/dyatlovmania/



#1002 fortyck

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Napisano 08 listopad 2018 - 23:03

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From Russia with Doubt
There is a book about art called that but I like the title all the same.
The sources for this article are Galina Sazonova and Komsomolskaya Pravda documentary "Dyatlov Pass. End of Story?"
Latest development on the attempts to reopen the case
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Leonid Georgievich Proshkin
In 2014 Komsomolskaya Pravda (KP) (big Russian periodical) signed an agreement with Leonid Proshkin, a former investigator of the Russian Federation Investigative Committee (IC), and now a lawyer, to file a claim the case to be reopened.
In order to make a decision whether there are grounds for reopening, the IC began a preliminary inquiry.
Preliminary inquiry is when a decision has to be made if there is reason - new information, to open the case.
Investigation is when the case is open.
For the preliminary inquiry was appointed one of the leading investigators of Russia - Vladimir Nikolaevich Solovyev.
This preliminary inquiry lasted almost 3 years.
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Vladislav Ivanovich Tuykov
The storage policy of the closed case files is that the documents can be disposed of 25 years after the case is closed.
According to the memoirs of the former criminalist and judge Vladimir Ankudinov, the prosecutor of the Sverdlovsk region Vladislav Ivanovich Tuykov decided the case files not to be destroyed as “socially significant”.
Not all physical evidence had the same good fortune.
Head of Sverdlovsk Forensic Science Laboratory K. P. Kretov kept the tent.
After Kretov died in the 80s the tent was taken to the garbage container, apparently water pipe burst back in the late 70s and the tent collected mold.
The storage policy for evidence as well as case files is that they can be destroyed 25 years after the case is closed.
We owe it to prosecutor Tuykov that we can actually leaf through the case files today.
Tuykov is now passed away, lets hope the case files don't have same fate as the tent.
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Vladimir Nikolaevich Solovyev
Senior investigator and forensic expert at the General Directorate for Criminalistics (Forensic Center) of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation.
In the period of 1991-2015 headed the investigation of the murder of the royal family.
As a result new archived documents came to light and were published by KP.
Two documents stand out - the telegram from Kolevatov sister Rimma addressed to Khrushchev and a special message from the Minister of the Interior Ministry.
He also found in the classified archive some documents on this case from Central Committee of the CPSU.
KP began the process of declassifying these documents and the bureaucratic procedure took took about a year.
In principle, there is nothing particularly new there, except for the memorandum of one of the party workers.
There is also nothing special in it except for one - it contains document numbers (everything is numbered in the Central Committee, each page) that were used in this note.
According to Natalya Varsegova in her speech at the Yekaterinburg conference in 2017 "some of these numbers were scratched with a razor" when declassified.
We also clearly see by the pagination that not all is declassified.
Some of the documents still remain classified.
The IC is not obliged to report what they are is doing, but they are by law required to issue a final conclusion.
We don't know all the actions of Solovyev during the preliminary inquiry.
From the movie “Dyatlov Pass. End of History?” one document gets into the frame 1:22:33 indicative that Solovyev conducted an officially recorded conversation with Okishev as part of the preliminary inquiry.
He analyzed the criminal case for procedural violations.
The conduct of a criminal case is regulated by law.
This is part of the explanation given by Okishev to investigator Solovyov.
You can see it in frame 1:22:40 that the criminal case was closed under pressure from above, and this confession on its own could have been the grounds to reopen the case.
After filing an application, the Investigation Committee initiated their own preliminary inquiry of the case materials in order to make a decision on its results - whether to open the case or not.
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Evgeniy Fyodorovich Okishev
KP was able to find Okishev, who oversaw Lev Ivanov.
The interview taken in 2013 addresses the same questions to the investigator Solovyev asked Okishev as part of the preliminary inquiry.
Okishev states for the protocol that they were pressured, they were not allowed to investigate, and at the end they were removed from the case.
This fact only should be enough enough for the Investigative Committee to admit the violations and reopen the case.
Evgeniy Fyodorovich was 94 at the time of the interviews.
Despite his advanced age, Evgeniy Fyodorovich remembers those events very well, because in his prosecutor’s practice the case of the death of Dyatlov group became the most mysterious.
In 1959, Evgeniy Okishev was the Deputy Chief of the Investigation Department of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Sverdlovsk Region.
This is what he remembers:
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Sergey Yakovlevich Shkryabach
According to KP journalist Natalya Varsegova, Solovyov was at some point removed from the case.
“Last year, his official representative Vladimir Markin resigned from the Investigative Committee - thanks to him, Komsomolskaya Pravda gets the conclusion [on the death of Dyatlov Group], which was written by another person - former investigator of the Investigation Committee Sergey Yakovlevich Shkryabach.
We invited him to the editorial office - the conversation turned out to be difficult, because, as it seemed to me, he was not very familiar with the material.
He is a mountaineer himself, with great experience, he has many ascents, and he is of the opinion that it was a snow slab (the main ambassador of this theory is St. Petersburg scientist and mountaineer Evgeniy Buyanov).
” “The conclusion is absurd and puts us at a dead end - says Natalya. - The IC would have made it public on television if Markin hadn’t resigned.”
After that, the IC summoned all interested parties and said that the case would not be reopened and because they are officially bound to give an answer why - they base their answer on Shkryabach’s conclusion that main role in the death of Dyatlov Pass played an avalanche."
In the interview is mentioned avalanche, bad weather, panic, disorientation and hypothermia.
The injuries of Dubinina, Tibo and Zolotaryov are explained with the choice of a bad spot for the den - on top of a grotto carved by the river which at some point collapsed underneath them and huge amount of snow fell on top of them.
Natalya Varsegova - "The fact that Shkryabach was retired from the IC at the time he wrote his conclusion hence didn't have the right to give an opinion was overlooked.
Shkryabach's opinion could not be the official response of the IC.
In theory, lawyer Proshkin, had all the opportunities at that time to demand an official response.
For some reason he didn't act on it.
Having assessed the whole situation, the KP came to the conclusion that it is impossible to achieve the truth in this way, the IC simply does not want to answer questions, even though it is obligated.
So we did the documentary "Dyatlov Pass. The End of History?"
What happened next and why is everything so secretive?
Fruitless and unnecessary application repeating same path, getting same answer
In 2018 Dyatlov foundation hires the same lawyer, who has been working on this case with Komsomolskaya Pravda for almost 3 years.
The fact that he didn't bring any results doesn't seem to matter.
Attorney Proshkin files an application with the same Investigative Committee as in 2014.
We don't know the text of the first request in 2014.
For the request in 2018 we can judge from the fund raising page for the balance of his payment.
"A loophole... in the regulations concerning reopening closed cases and with the aid of the descendants of Rustem Slobodin and Yuri Doroshenko...
The path that will be taken to reopen the case is the rights of the victims to a comprehensive and objective investigation of the case for which there is no legal obstacle."
This is not what the Investigative Committee thinks about that.
Here is the official response to that. Shkryabach all over again.
This is a text from the explanation given by Okishev to investigator Solovyov.
You can see it in frame 1:22:40.
Okishev clearly states that the investigation was pressured and they closed the case under duress from above.
In principle, this only would be enough to reopen the criminal case.
The Investigative Committee not only doesn't take this in consideration, but judging by the latest official response from 31 of August 2018 that lists at the bottom all previous unsuccessful claims to reopen the case: "Your complaints dated 21st November 2014 and 18th February 2015 were not officially registered or considered by the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation", no such application was ever received hence no conversation between Solovyov and Okishev ever took place?
We do not know whether Proshkin referred to Okishev in his appeal to the IC.
There is a one document gets into the frame direct connection between Okishev and Solovyev, but it is no proof if Proshkin used Okishev testimony for grounds of his claim.
* * *
I have been rooting through Russians forums and there are many claims for the case to be reopened, usually in the form of collective letters sent through Kremlin site.
To name a few:
– Request or open letter to the President of the RF (link to Russian forum) and the answer
– After the movie came out an official document shows in frame 1:22:33, a member of a Russian forum wrote a request to the IC for explaination on the basis was this official document created?
As part of what is the official preliminary inquiry?
And he received this answer - within the framework of the appeal of Komsomolskaya Pravda chief editor Sungorkin.
This doesn't explain anything.
The point is that the answers always repeat Shkryabach.

Exhumation, the media charade

 

Something really sensational needs to happen in order for the claim to stand a chance.
When the exhumation of the remains of Zolotaryov took place on 12 of April, 2018 i don't think anybody expected the media charade that followed, but at least something was happening.
Komsomolskaya Pravda is on the look for a reason to reopen the case.
From the interview with Shkryabach:
– In your opinion, should the case be reopened?
– No.
To reopen a case one needs newly discovered specific circumstances.
And we do not have that.
– What about exhumation?
– In this case, we can only see the nature of the fractures.
And that's all.
This procedure will lead to nothing more.
And it didn't, but we were put on a roller coaster to believe that this is not Zolotaryov.
The bomb shell of the first DNA analysis was not overwritten by the second DNA showing a match.
As of today, 7 of November 2018 Wikipedia still says "the DNA analysis did not reveal any similarity to the DNA of living relatives".
No update on the second DNA analysis.
 
 
 
 


#1003 fortyck

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Napisano 09 listopad 2018 - 21:51

Dyatlov Pass Mystery 

 

In January 1959, nine Soviet college students were killed under mysterious circumstances while hiking through the Ural Mountains in what's now known as the Dyatlov Pass incident.

 

On Jan. 31, of that year, 23-year-old ski hiker Igor Alekseievich Dyatlov and his team of eight experienced ski hikers from the Ural Polytechnical Institute embarked on a journey to reach the peak of Otorten, a mountain in the Northern Urals.

 

None of the hikers were ever seen alive again...

 

Special thanks to Sara for researching and sending me this script!

 

Much appreciated my friend.

 

Link to new theory about the initial findings on the hikers tent:

 

https://www.svetlana...om/blog/dyat...

 



#1004 fortyck

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Napisano 12 listopad 2018 - 23:58

All court refusals to reopen the case are based on this document.

 

The conclusion of the veteran investigator is that the death of Dyatlov group is caused by avalanche, deterioration of the weather, insufficient experience and preparation of the hikers for severe winter conditions.

 

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The mystery of the death of Dyatlov group - criminalist conclusion
«THE WORLD OF CRIMINOLOGY» №2/2017
23.
The topic of the death in 1959 of a group of tourists under the leadership of Dyatlov aroused considerable interest (see “The World of Criminology” №1 / 2017).
In continuation of the topic - an article by Sergey Yakovlevich Shkryabach, who in 2015 on behalf of the leadership of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, studied the materials of the discontinued criminal case about the death of a group of tourists under the leadership of Dyatlov in order to verify the completeness and objectivity of the investigation, the validity of the decisions made on it.
We present excerpts from the conclusion of S. Y. Shkryabach, made after the investigation of the criminal case.
They are also interesting because the author has extensive experience in mountain tourism, being a member of more than 25 ascents and 20 expeditions in the Pamir, Tien Shan, Caucasus, Altai, Eastern Sayan mountains, as well as in Kamchatka and the Arctic.
Shkryabach Sergey Yakovlevich,
veteran investigative and forensic services,
State Counselor of Justice Class 3,
Honorary Worker of the Prosecutor's Office of the RF,
Honorary Officer of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation The mystery of the death of Dyatlov group - criminalist conclusion
The present criminal case was instituted on February 26, 1959 by the prosecutor of the town of Ivdel, Sverdlovsk region, V. I. Tempalov on the fact (as stated in the resolution) the discovery on this day in the area of peak 1079 the bodies of Y. G. Krivonischenko, Z. A. Kolmogorova, I. A. Dyatlov and other hikers students of the Sverdlovsk Polytechnic Institute.
However, it follows from the case file that on February 26, 1959 the tent of the tourists was found on the slope of peak 1079 by a search team.
The bodies were discovered only on 27.02.59 - 4, 05.03.59 - 1 and 04.05.59 - 4.
From March 2, 1959, the prosecutor-criminalist of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Sverdlovsk Region was involved in the investigation.
Separate investigative actions, besides L. N. Ivanov and V. I. Tempalov, were also carried out by the investigator Ivdel Kuzminyh.
There is no decisions to assign L. N. Ivanov to lead the criminal case or to form an investigation team.
May 28, 1959, with the consent of the prosecutor of the Sverdlovsk region, L. N. Ivanov complying with paragraph 5 of Art. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, discontinued the investigation of this criminal case on the basis that overwhelming force was the cause of the death of the tourists, which they were unable to overcome, and that between the actions of those who allowed shortcomings in the sports activities, and
24.
the death of tourists are not related, therefore there are no facts and circumstances constituting a breach of a law i.e. crime (Corpus delicti)
The investigation found the following.
January 23, 1959 a group of 10 tourists under the patronage of the sports tourist club of the Ural Polytechnic Institute led by student I. A. Dyatlov went on a ski trip with a total length of 300 km along the route: city of Sverdlovsk - city of Ivdel - village of Vizhay - village of 2nd Northern - Auspiya river - Mount Otorten - upper sources of Auspiya, Unya, Vishera and Niols rivers - Mount Oyka-Chakur - Northern Toshemka river - village of Vizhay - city of Ivdel - city of Sverdlovsk.
Besides I. A. Dyatlov the group includes: L. A. Dubinina, Z. A. Kolmogorova, A. S. Kolevatov, Y. E. Yudin, Y. N. Doroshenko - students of UPI; A. A. Zolotaryov - instructor Kourovskoy tourist base, as well as R. V. Slobodin, Y. G. Krivonischenko and N. V. Thibeaux-Brignolle - former students of UPI, currently engineers of the enterprises of Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk.
They traveled to the uninhabited village of the 2nd North by rail, road, and horse-drawn vehicles, and from there, on the morning of January 28, 1959, they began an independent skiing movement.
Ill Y. E. Yudin returned to Sverdlovsk.
According to the general diary of the group and the personal diary of Kolmogorova, by January 31, 1959, the group, observing the itinerary and traveling over 40 km, approached the branch of the Northern Urals in the upper sources of the Auspiya river and attempted to cross one of the tributaries of the Lozva river between peak 1079 ( currently denoted as Mount Kholat Syakhl with an altitude of 1096 m) and 880 (currently denoted as height 905 m).
However, when faced with a storm wind and icing of the slope, they returned to spend the night in the forest in the upper reaches of Auspiya river, where they found themselves sheltered from the wind, but in a very deep snow — up to 2 m.
After January 31, 1959, there are no entries in diaries.
According to the route plan, the group was supposed to pass between the heights of 1079 and 880 into the valley of the Lozva river and, moving north, north-west along the ridge to its source at the base of Mount Otorten, ascend around 2 February 1959.
Then go down the same way in the upper reaches of the Auspiya river and through the two passes, as well as the upper reaches of the Unya, Vishera and Nyols rivers, head south to Oyka-Chakur mountain (see pic 1-3).
There is no information on the group’s movement after January 31, 1959.
The route of the group ran through unpopulated territories and its participants did not have any means of communication ).
In accordance with the protocol of the Route commission of the Committee for Physical Education and Sport of the Sverdlovsk City Executive Committee, the deadline for receiving a telegram from Dyatlov about the end of the expedition was on February 12, 1959.
Following inquiries of friends and family of the missing tourists, the search started only on 20 February same year when the UPI management sent on the group's rout one group then some more
25.
search groups of experienced mountaineers, units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, aircraft and helicopters of civil and military aviation.
Since the exact place where tourists could be, was not known, search groups of five people were sent and dropped off by helicopter to the main points of the route.
In the area of the Mount Otorten and the upper sources of Lozva and Austiya rivers were sent groups led by master of sports M. A. Akselrod and student B. E. Slobtsov.
February 26, 1959 on the eastern slope of Mount 1079 (1096) B. E. Slobtsov and a member of his group M. I. Sharavin found the tent of the Dyatlov group.
The tent was completely covered with snow. Outward on a few centimeters acted only the angle of the roof, supported by the remaining front pillar (ski pole).
From the words of B. E. Slobtsov and interviews of M. I. Sharavina (he was not interrogated, because during the period of investigation he was on treatment for the injury received during the search) the snow over the tent (after removing the upper thin layer) was so dense that it had to be cut out of the surface in daytime with an ice ax.
The skis used to support (hang - ed. note) the tent were dig out only after the tent was excavated.
In the tent there was practically all the equipment and personal belongings of the group members: backpacks, blankets (of which two were spread out), warm clothes, storm suits, hats and (with some exceptions) all shoes.
The entrance to the tent faced southeast at the remaining pillar was closed and blocked by a disassembled stove, dishes and other things.
Shoes and clothing were located near the side of the tent adjacent to the mountain.
The slope of the roof located on the opposite side and facing the side of the slope, in the direction of which (as it will be determined later) the tourists lay with their heads, was cut and torn in two places from top to bottom.
A fur jacket was tucked in a gap located closer to the entrance of the tent.
All pairs of skis were laid out under the tent, except for the one that lay next to it.
There were no signs of struggle or the presence of other people, as well as craters from explosions or any other cataclysms, either in or near the tent.
The scene of the incident was examined by the prosecutor of the city of Ivdel V. I. Tempalov. with the participation of the head of the search operation V. P. Maslennikov only February 28, 1959, when the tent was dug out and the roof racks were restored using skis.
According to this protocol, the tent was located on a 30° slope about 300 m below the top of 1079 (pic 4-6).
Down the slope for up to 500 m in the snow, there were traces of feet without shoes and individual traces of felt boots (8–9 pairs) going from the tent towards the forest.
Traces are preserved in the form of columns of pillars of snow several centimeters high.
Less dense snow blown around them by the storm wind.
The traces of tracks were located close to each other, converged and again dispersed close to one another.
Closer to the border of the forest, the tracks disappeared under the snow.
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After discovering the tent, on February 27, 1959 all the search groups were called to the region of 1076 (Kholat Syakhl - 1097 mountain).
To the south of this mountain in the upper reaches of Auspiya river, near (as it turned out later) the campsite of Dyatlov group on the night of January 31, 1959, the search parties setup their base camp.
The search operation was headed by the master of sports E. P. Maslennikov.
On the same day - February 27, 1959 - down the slope in the direction whrere the footprints were headed the partially covered with snow bodies of Doroshenko and Krivonishchenko, lying next to each other, were found, and higher up the slope in the direction of the tent were found the bodies of Dyatlov and Kolmogorova.
According to the protocol of the inspection of the scene from the same date, the bodies of Doroshenko and Krivonischenko were stripped down to their underwear and were located 1,500 meters from the top of 1079 near the forest border under a single cedar tree near the remains of a fire.
According to the same protocol, 400 m from the fire in the direction of the tent, the body of Dyatlov was found covered with snow, and in the same direction 500 m above Dyatlov's body Kolmogorova’s body was found under the snow.
Both bodies were located in a straight line - from the fire to tent.
Dyatlov lay on his back near a small birch, head in the direction of the tent.
Kolmogorova lay face down in a dynamic posture of movement and "according to the position of the body, tried not to climb the mountain, but to stay in place".
The examination was carried out by the prosecutor of the city of Ivdel V. I. Tempalov with the participation of the head of search operation E. P. Maslennikov.
Later on, in the decision to terminate the criminal case L. N. Ivanov stated other information and assessments of these circumstances.
Including data on the distances of the bodies.
In his interpretation, all five bodies were found on February 26, 1959.
The distance from the location of the first two bodies is 1500 m to the tent, and not to the top of top 1079, as indicated in the inspection report of February 27, 1959.
The distance from these two bodies to Dyatlov's body has changed from 400 to 300 m, and from Dyatlov's body to Kolmogorova's body - from 500 to 330 m.
Further, in the materials of the criminal case, the angle of the slope at the place of detection of the tent decreased, compared to the protocol of the inspection of the scene from February 28, 1959 from 30 to 18–20°, and its location relative to the top 1079 from 300 to 150 m.
Most likely, a lot of this data was taken from the assumptions and estimates of the search eparticipnats, as well as from the reporting commissions of the Sverdlovsk Regional Executive Committee.
The distances to the location of the bodies are most likely taken from the testimony of the head of the search operation V. P. Maslennikov on March 10, 1959, and the calculations made by him in the scheme attached to his testimony.
Including complete information about the circumstances of the discovery of the body of the fifth hiker - R. V. Slobodin, who was found under a layer of snow (more than 20 cm) as a result of search efforts only on March 5, 1959.
There is no protocol of inspection of the place where the body of Slobodin was found.
According to the testimony of E. P. Maslennikov the body of Slobodin was headed in the direction of the tent in a straight line, as were the other bodies 180 m above the body of Dyatlov and 150 m below the body of Kolmogorova.
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During search operations on March 2, 1959, when they were trying to locate where Dyatlov group spent the night of on March (January? - ed. note) 31, 1959 in the upper reaches of Auspiya river (100 m from the bank) and 300 m from the search base camp setup on February 27, 1959, search party found the cache site with product (labaz).
It is assumed that the storage site was built by Dyatlov group. According to the route plan, Dyatlov intended to return to the same place after the ascent to Otorten to continue the hike to the south.
According to the inspection report dated March 2, 1959, in the improvised warehouse built of logs, plywood and fir branches were stored food supplies, one pair of spare skis, two pairs of boots, ski mounts and two batteries with a light bulb.
The rescue expedition continued prospecting, including probing the area with avalanche probes (thin metal pins 1.5 m long), however, due to weather deterioration (a sudden increase in frost and stormy winds), and injuries to ice and rocky parts by several participants they were terminated on March 8, 1959.
When the searches were resumed on May 4, 1959 the bodies of the remaining four participants in the expedition were found deep under the snow.
According to the protocol of inspection of May 6, 1959, conducted by the prosecutor of the city of Ivdel V. I. Tempalov the bodies of L. A. Dubinina, A. S. Kolevatov, A. A. Zolotaryov and N. V. Thibeaux-Brignolle were in a strong putrefaction (“decomposed”) in the water near the bank of one of the tributaries of Lozva river under snow more than 2 m deep and 50 m (in the order to dismiss the case it was written - at a depth of 4–4.5 m and 75 m) from the single cedar - the place where the bodies of Doroshenko and Krivonischenko were found.
At 6 m higher under the snow at a depth of more than 3 m, a flooring of cut branches was found.
Analysis of photographs from the scene suggests that the bodies and the flooring (pile of branches) were under dense snow at a depth of more than 5 m.
Fragments of clothing cut off from the bodies of Doroshenko and Krivonischenko were found on the so-called flooring and near it.
The deceased Thibeaux-Brignolle and Zolotaryov were found better dressed than the others.
Dubinina was the last clothed of the four - her faux-fur jacket and cap turned out to be on Zolotaryov.
Dubinina’s bare foot was wrapped in a piece of Krivonishchenko woolen trousers.
According to the decision to stop the investigation, a Krivonischenko's knife was found near the bodies, with which young firs were cut off by the fire.
There is no mentioning of a knife in the inspection report dated May 6, 1959.
According to the findings of forensic investigations of teh bodies, Y. N. Doroshenko, Y. G. Krivonischenko, I. A. Dyatlov, Z. A. Kolmogorova, R. V. Slobodin and A. S. Kolevatov have no significant bodily injuries.
The death of these persons came from exposure to low temperatures (freezing).
According to forensic medical autopsy reports, L. A. Dubinina had symmetrical rib fracture: on the right 2, 3, 4, 5 and on the left 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and
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hemorrhage in the myocardium.
А. А. Zolotaryov has fractures of the right ribs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 along the circumferential and midclavicular lines.
N.V. Thibeaux-Brignolle has an extensive hemorrhage in the right temporal muscle - correspondingly to it - a depressed fracture of the bones of the skull 3 x 7 cm in size.
I was specified that their injuries in conjunction with the effects of low temperatures led to their death.
These injuries are caused by a great force applied on a large area surfaces (there are no localized hemorrhages of the corresponding external surfaces of the body).
Also, expert studies have established that the tent roof panel on the right side has three cuts made from the inside.
The watches found on Dyatlov, Slobodin and Thibeaux-Brignolle were not investigated for the reason why did they stop (wound down, damage).
During the investigation test for radiation were carried out (with an incomprehensible purpose) of garments of the dead.
Their results have nothing to do with the causes and circumstances of the death of these individuals.
The declassified materials of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the ongoing inquiry about these events were also studied.
In them nothing more that it is already in the criminal case was found.
Analysis of the materials of the criminal case, as well as inspections of these events, conducted by various instances, points that there is no objective data on the involvement of any individuals, institutions or organizations in February 1959 in the Ivdel district of the Sverdlovsk region.
And if the final conclusion about the absence of corpus delicti (crime) in the actions of the officials involved in organizing this campaign can be conditionally considered correct, then the circumstances determining the presence or absence of a crime have not been fully investigated, which caused and causes doubts about the justification of the termination of the investigation.
The statement that "the cause of the death of tourists was overwhelming force, which they were unable to overcome", requires a clear argumentation with objective evidence the the investigation didn't provide.
The fact that they, in severe frost, half-clothed, left the tent on their own and six of them froze, and three died, including from serious injuries of internal organs, is no reason to relate everything that happened to the action of overwhelming force without studying and explaining the causes, circumstances and mechanism of these events.
This simplified attitude to decision making can only indicate a non-professional approach not only by L. N. Ivanov, but also by other persons who participated in the investigation to collect, research and evaluate objective data.
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Most likely, they simply did not know how else to investigate these circumstances, so they made a possibly intuitively correct, but unreasonable decision.
This rightly caused many people, including professional lawyers, who did not know and understand the mechanisms of extreme situations, distrust of the results of the investigation and the belief that there was some kind of hidden secret information or ufo phenomena.
A study of the materials of the criminal case gives reason to believe that in fact in 1959 the investigation was conducted at a low (unfortunately, even at amateurish) level.
Landmarks and detailed photographs were not taken during the inspections of the incident sites.
Available photos can be called survey only conditionally.
Accurate measurements and reference to specific landmarks of detected objects and bodies are not available in the protocols.
Plans (schemes) were not drawn up by prosecutors and investigators.
It is almost impossible to establish from the investigation materials exactly where the tent and the bodies were found.
In particular, the incompleteness of the study of the sequence of events reflected on the objectivity of assessing the cause of death of A. S. Kolevatov, L. A. Dubinina, A. A. Zolotaryov and N.V. Thibeaux-Brignolle.
According to the findings of the forensic scientist, the death of L.A. Dubinina and A. A. Zolotaryov came from damage to internal organs as a result of multiple fractures of the ribs, and the death of N. V. Thibeaux-Brignolle - from hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the skull.
And all this in addition (it is not clear what is the connection) with the exposure to low temperature.
The expert made such conclusions only on the grounds that histological studies revealed hemorrhages in the places of fractures.
However, given the strong putrefactive changes in the internal organs of corpses, this can only indicate that the fractures were in vivo (pre mosrtem).
At the same time, all three corpses were found under a 3–5 meter layer of snow, in conditions and in postures that do not exclude the possibility of injury from compression, and the onset of death - from mechanical asphyxiation and hypothermia (freezing).
What can be concluded from the rib fractures on both sides of L.A. Dubinina and the absence in the areas of internal injuries on the external surfaces of all bodies traces of application of instruments with limited surface damage.
Since the histology test results were received on the day of the ruling on the termination of the criminal case, the circumstances, the mechanism and the real reasons for the death of S. A. Kolevatov, L. A. Dubinina, A. A. Zolotareva and N. V. Thibeaux-Brignolle were not investigated at all.
In fact, the circumstances of the events are not fully understood.
No answers were given to questions about the motives for setting up a tent on the mountainside, the reasons for leaving it, the sequence of events that led to the tragedy and death of all hikers.
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The state and features of the area have not been studied.
Information about the weather and seismic activity in the area for the period of the tragic events were not requested.
No analysis of the level of extremity of the situation, readiness and psychology of behavior of the group members was conducted with the involvement of high-class specialists.
The opinions of individuals were taken as the basis for evaluating these tragic events, the insufficient experience of some of them not only did not meet the necessary requirements for this, but was also based on obvious delusions.
This includes the conclusions and doubts of L. N. Ivanov himself, who did not fully appreciate the situation that had developed during the period of the death of the Dyatlov group, which resulted in their misunderstanding of the whole mechanism of the incident.
Of course, even now, the investigation of these events has a certain complexity due to the impossibility in 56 years of time to carry out a full collection of the necessary additional information about the circumstances of this tragedy and materials about other events accompanying it.
However, in order to make a decision about the need for additional research and measures, a full assessment should be made of all the available objective data, as well as other information that is currently available.
First of all need to be analysed:
  • all available materials about the expedition and the participants;
  • information about the organization and the results of the search operation, including information from other sources, as well as evidence and reports from the search participants;
  • all objective data about the present material evidence and the bodies, their formal and informal examination;
  • declassified and other official materials related to this criminal case;
  • information and analytical studies of meteorological and seismic situations in the area (region) in the period of the tragedy;
  • available scientific and practical research in the field of similar extreme conditions and the psychology of behavior of participants in such events;
  • theories and opinions of prominent experts in the field of mountaineering and mountain tourism about the mechanism and causes of similar tragedies in high mountain and winter conditions.

 

According to the available materials on the preparation of the Dyatlov tourist group and data on the course of the hike itself, one can assess the degree of readiness of its participants for the negative development of an extreme situation.
Based on the available information, the level of preparation of the group was considerably overestimated by its assessment by the commission.
In fact, at that time, sports tourism was only in its infancy and only in the 70s began to be divided into mountain (traveling through the passes) and water (rafting on mountain rivers).
In the Urals, sports tourism was group travel using any means of movement (hiking, skiing, water) in
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sparsely populated and difficult areas and was based only on the personal experience of its enthusiasts and local hunters.
These trips were divided into: weekend trips, 1st, 2nd and 3rd category of difficulty.
The combination of their number determined the assignment of sports categories.
The participants of these campaigns did not have serious climbing training.
In this region, mountaineering has not been developed, as the Urals, belongs to the old, not high and heavily destroyed mountains and does not have most of the peaks of even the lowest category of mountaineering complexity.
They presented a problem to traverse only in winter.
Most of the members of the group were participants of 4-6 trips for 3-4 years of study at the institute.
By the combination of the number of these trips, some of them could qualify for 2nd category of difficulty in tourism.
None of the hikers has ever participated in a winter expedition of 3rd category of complexity.
I. A. Dyatlov participated in only one trek of 3rd category (under the leadership of M. A. Akselrod) and is characterized as a strong and ambitious tourist.
In fact, he “stewed in his own juice” - of the 9 expedition he was part of he led 6.
It seems that I. A. Dyatlov lacked the level of experience that an expedition of this complexity required.
The preparation of the members of the group to participate in a difficult winter hike in the mountains was clearly insufficient.
The focus was on skiing, general equipment, products.
According to the plan of the expedition, they had to go through five passes and climb two peaks, but they did not have any safety equipment (ropes, strapping, carabiners, rappel gear), or any other climbing equipment (ice axes, crampons).
In the training materials, only a 20-meter-long prusik is mentioned (a thin auxiliary rope not suitable for securing), which was not found during inspections.
There was only one ice ax found at the tent and, according to the photos, belonged to A. A. Zolotaryov.
Meanwhile, in the winter, the Northern Urals are characterized by strong (to –50 °) frosts and storm winds.
Therefore, almost all passes and peaks have extensive ice and icy slopes of compacted snow (firn), which is very difficult to traverse without special skills and equipment.
On the negative results of this training, an entry in the group’s diary dated January 31, 1959 says that when they first tried to overcome an uncomplicated pass near 880, they did not have the necessary equipment and experience, having encountered an icy slope in strong wind and descended to the low of the river Auspiya.
It is difficult to imagine how they intended to overcome the five passes and climb two peaks in the days to come.
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In addition, as follows from the materials of the criminal case, the group actually did not have a full-fledged map of the area (topographic maps of the General Staff were classified at that time), copies of forestry drawing topographic objects.
Given that their route was the first ascent, the group went almost at random.
It seems that the route of such a length (21 days) of length (about 300 km) and complexity this group could overcome without incident only with sufficiently favorable weather conditions and luck.
The main route ran two to four days from the nearest settlement.
In the event of injury or illness of any member of the expedition, it would take even more time to transport him.
It was not known whether emergency situations were worked out in the group, although the materials of the route commission allegedly contain information on the options for changing the group's route when weather conditions deteriorate.
In the materials of the criminal case, as in the materials of the group’s preparation, there is no data on attempts to get at least some information about the long-term forecast of meteorological conditions in the region.
Thus, although the decision to admit the group to the hike, taking into account the formal "experience" of its participants, was considered justified, the hike itself, given their actual readiness and lack of communication, was a dangerous and rather adventurous event.
Any significant error under extreme conditions and the lack of necessary knowledge of how to act when they occur inevitably lead to tragic consequences in such expeditions, and this is what happened.
When evaluating materials about the organization, the course and results of search activities, it is necessary to state the following.
There was no system in organizing such search operation in the region.
There wasn't (even formally) any dedicated voluntary search and rescue squad from among the most experienced tourists and climbers.
As a result, the search work actually began 22 days after the tragedy by hastily created search groups from among tourists, most of whom had experience not higher, but even lower than those missing.
Only one group was led by an experienced tourist M. A. Akselrod (who later gave the most realistic assessment of what happened).
Only by February 26, 1959, the master of sports E. P. Maslennikov headed the search expedition on his own initiative.
Later, from Moscow arrived a group of tourists headed by a member of the routing and qualification commission of the Presidium of the All-Union Tourism Section, master of sports K. I. Bardin.
In fact, all assessments on the detection of physical evidence and bodies in criminal case were based, as already noted above, on provisional data set forth by the said commission, and not on the results of investigative actions.
A tent on the slope was discovered and dug out of snow on February 26, 1959 by B. E. Slobtsov group ( a mountaineer with little experience at the time of the events). The site
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was examined by the prosecutor of Ivdel only on February 28, 1959, after significant changes in the situation.
The body of R. V. Slobodin (found on March 5, 1959) and the place of its discovery were not examined at all.
The bodies of L. A. Dubinina, A.S. Kolevatov, A. A. Zolotaryov and N.V. Thibeaux-Brignolle were found on May 4, 1959 and examined on the spot on May 6, 1959.
At the same time the items found with the bodies are not mentioned in the protocol at all.
As already noted, the measurement data on the location of the tent and the bodies indicated in the inspection reports do not correspond to the data set out in the materials of the aforementioned commission and in the decision to terminate the criminal case.
There is no information about attempts to analyze weather conditions for the estimated period of death of the group and their changes until the moment of the search works in the criminal case or in the materials of the commission.
Meanwhile, the commission’s conclusion shows that if at the beginning of the search expedition the weather conditions were acceptable, by the end of February - the beginning of March the weather deteriorated sharply, the frost increased, and the blizzards and hurricane winds began, despite the fact that the bodies of four tourists were still missing, and served as the basis for the termination of the search on March 8, 1959.
There is no data on studies of the snow-ice cover in the area of the tragedy to determine the characteristics of its layers, stages and conditions for their formation.
With this in mind, no attempts were made to invite relevant specialists (meteorologists, seismologists, glaciologists, psychologists, climbers, etc.) to conduct case studies on the mechanism and sequence of the situation and the actions of the group members with the collection, analysis and evaluation of objective data.
The investigation did not even make an attempt to independently model the event mechanism, compare and analyze the position and condition of the tent at the time of its detection (and not at the time of inspection), traces around it to determine how could they leave, the sequence and direction of movement of the group, taking into account the characteristics of the terrain and wind.
Instead was taken into account the opinion of the often unseasoned tourists about the safety of the camp setup in such conditions and the allegedly sufficient experience among the hikers.
As a result of the amateurish assessment of this situation, the true causes and conditions for the emergency evacuation from the tent were not established, and a whole “bunch” of shady (not mentioned in the criminal case) versions of the existence of some unknown forces and secret events made the victims flee the tent in a panic, condemning themselves to death in conditions of snowstorms, hurricane winds and 40 degrees of cold.
This led to the appearance of information in the case of fireballs, radiological studies of the clothing of victims, etc., which, of course, did not provide anything for the investigation.
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Only later, certain time after the end of the investigation, did the real version of the sudden avalanche emerge, which was supported by M. A. Akselrod and B. E. Slobtsov (pic 7-8).
This version was initially excluded on the basis of an erroneous assessment of the situation in connection with the following:
1. Most of the participants in the rescue operation and representatives of the prosecutor's office observed the scene in good weather 26 days after a significant change in snow cover.
This is evidenced by the detection of the distinctly protruding 5–8 cm traces of footprints of the members of the group down the slope from the tent.
Such traces of compaction can be formed by a person’s feet when moving in snow no less than 40 cm high and became embossed after blown by the wind (not below the storm level) around a less dense layer of snow for the same 40 cm.
This means that in the area of ​​the tent at the time of its leaving, the height of the snow was not less than 40 cm higher than when it was detected.
From the testimony of B. E. Slobtsov and from the words of a member of his search group M. I. Sharavin (not interrogated) it follows that on February 26, 1959, they found the front pole of the tent sticking out a few centimeters from under heavy snow, which they subsequently excavated.
This means that at the time when the members of the group left the tent there was at least 40 cm more of snow.
The supporters of the “exotic” versions claiming that the tent was allegedly covered with snow only after the tourists left it are not consistent, as then the group’s traces down the slope would have been completely covered by snow and wouldn't be visible at all.
Most of the fantastic versions were put forward on the basis of the general delusion that tourists left the tent not covered with snow, in a hurry cut out passages in its canopy to lower the slope, as the entrance to it was already blocked, and allegedly jumped out in such a way during normal visibility from a free-standing tent from some kind of inexplicable horror.
2. There is even among fairly experienced high mountain climbers, not to mention tourists, a massive misconception about the conditions and mechanism of avalanche and the consequences of such disasters.
The statistical data cited several years ago when the Mountaineers Club of St. Petersburg conducted the causes and conditions for the death of the Dyatlov group indicate that over 80% of the tourists (among all the dead) perish in avalanches.
Among climbers of even a very high class, a significant number die of avalanches as a result of a wrong choice of a place to sleep (bivouac installation) and errors when crossing avalanche prone slopes.
Cases of mass death of climbers in base camps and on the routes of movement take place in all known mountain ranges of the world, in
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particular the Himalayas, the Pamirs, Tien Shan, the Andes, the Cordillera, the Caucasus, the Alps.
Personal experience of falling into avalanches and participation in rescue missions suggests that the most common mistakes about the mechanism of the formation of avalanches include:
  • wrong idea of snow as a light substance (it does not take into account the fact that the greater its mass and humidity, the greater its density);
  • wrong presumption that a large angle of inclination of the surface (at least 45–50°) on which the snow mass is located is necessary for an avalanche to descend, when in fact slopes above 50° avalanche are rare and avalanche is possible on an entirely non-steep slope.

 

From the materials of a series of methodological manuals "School of Mountaineering" (M. 2003–2010), edited by Honored Master of Sports in Mountaineering, Honored Coach of the USSR P. P. Zaharov we can understand the following.
Avalanche is the result of gravity.
If you select a certain form of an element (for example, a cube) of snow thickness lying on a slope, then, considering its equilibrium under the laws of mechanics, you can establish the following: the component of gravity, directed parallel to the slope, tends to move the cube down.
This force increases whit the mass of snow and its density.
But there are forces that counteract this component: mechanical adhesion with the underlying layer of snow, soil, natural friction force, supporting force of snow lying down the slope and holding force of adhesion with overlying snow.
The last forces are called contour.
Proceeding from this, as well as from the diversity of the mechanical properties of snow and its low stability, one can speak of the diversity of the "trigger mechanism" of avalanches in various conditions.
Depending on the conditions, the avalanche speed can reach 500 km/h.
The movement of snow at a speed of less than 1 m/s is estimated as a slab - a snow slab.
But avalanches moving at low speeds are deadly.
Even falling into a small avalanche of several cubic meters could be fatal.
There are enough examples when a layer of snow about 20 cm thick (!) Measuring 3x3 m killed people.
A very small collapse (only 5 m3 of snow with a density of 0.2 t/m3) at a speed of 10 m/s will be equivalent to hitting a car at a speed of 30 km/h.
Even the simplest of avalanches - a landslide measuring 25 by 30 m with a thickness of 20 cm is equal in volume to 100 m3 and weighs 20–30 tons!
According to studies, there is a widespread misconception that an avalanche requires a steep slope - more than 45°.
In fact, snow is poured from steep slopes in the presence of scanty volumes, and on slopes above 55° it does not linger at all.
Therefore, in the northern regions, including in Russia, roofs of houses, as a rule, are built at an angle of at least 45°, and in mountainous countries - 60° or more.
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The most optimal slopes for avalanches are 25–40°, and under certain circumstances, 15–20°.
Famous Russian (Soviet) avalanche specialist, Professor of the Department of Cryolitology and Glaciology, Faculty of Geography, MSU G. K. Tushinskiy systematically researched and classified avalanches according to the composition of the snow that forms them, the conditions and the “trigger mechanisms” of their descent, and the consequences that threaten a person if they hit them.
The main reasons for avalanches are that the critical mass of the snow volume exceeds the limiting possibility of its retention on the slope, i.e. the force of gravity, which tends to move it along a slope, exceeds the limit of the possibility of the contour forces to hold it.
But there are various factors that drastically change the balance of forces, provoking an avalanche coming down before it is fully "mature".
Such external influences, in addition to dynamic impacts in the form of eaves collapse, falling stones, earthquakes, and lightning discharges, include: cutting an avalanche-prone slope by climbers or skiers, as well as dramatically increasing or changing winds.
In mountaineering, there is a rule: not to go out in the highlands after a sharp deterioration in the weather with more than 30-40 cm of snow falling before its natural compaction, since this is a period of high avalanche danger.
This is due to the fact that in clear weather and constant winds on the slopes an icy (firn) layer, a kind of “ice slides”, is formed.
After a significant amount of snow falls on this “skating rink", the avalanche in many cases, before compaction and joining of the snow cap to the previous layer, is inevitable.
It is easy to provoke it, moving along the avalanche-dangerous elephant, couloir.
G. K. Tushinskiy recommends that the following factors be taken into account to determine the danger of avalanche:
  • the height of the snow cover in accordance with the slope steepness (the slope of the steepness of 150 can already be avalanche-prone);
  • condition of the underlying surface in case of newly fallen snow (possibility of the occurrence of layers and gliding planes);
  • new high snow that can cause an immediate avalanche (30 cm thick can be considered critical, especially if the snow is accompanied by wind);
  • intensity of snowfall, excluding the possibility of subsidence and stabilization (when the intensity of snowfall is more than 2 cm per hour, avalanches should be expected);
  • wind and intensity of snowstorm (the snowstorm factor itself should be considered as a sign of avalanche danger);
  • low air temperatures cool the surface, and the metamorphic processes inside the snow layer lead to the emergence of loosening horizons, causing the avalanche to disappear.

 

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Avalanches are not uniform.
There is a natural compaction of snow under its weight.
Depending on the mass and humidity of snow, the lower layers of the avalanche mass can have very high density and hardness and multiply its destructive power.
A special danger of falling into an avalanche lies in the fact that, as a rule, the movement of significant layers of snow begins both above and below the cut-off area and in most cases with a very fast onset of speed, which often makes it impossible to avoid it in time.
Thus, the foregoing suggests that an avalanche (most likely, in the form of a slab) could really be the cause of an emergency abandonment of the tent by Dyatlov group.
The terms of this in accordance with the above research factors given by G. K. Tushinskiy could be: a significant increase in the mass of snow on the mountainside, strong wind and frost, as well as cutting the avalanche slope by tourists themselves by crossing it and setting up a tent with digging up a large area of ​​snow that prevented the layer of snow from above to slide downwards.
As noted above, the weather conditions in the area during the tragedy were not analyzed by anyone, and therefore the conditions that form the basis for the death of tourists were not studied.
Meanwhile, even from the data of a foreign site, it is clear that on February 1, 1959, Dyatlov's group was in the area of the cyclone.
According to the aforementioned studies conducted by the Alpinists of St. Petersburg club with the involvement of specialists, including in the field of meteorology, when analyzing data from Ivdel, Nyaksimvol and Burmatovo meteorological stations located in the places of the tragedy, respectively, 117, 95 and 66 km, in the area on the night of February 1, 1959, the cyclone front (with a duration of at least 10 hours) passed, accompanied by heavy snowfall, wind intensifying to hurricane (20–30 m/s) in the direction from north-west to south-east and a drop in temperature environment to –40° C.
If we take into account the fact that the snowstorm lasted all day on February 1, 1959 and only intensified towards its end, as evidenced by the last photos of the group members (pic 12), the establishment of a camp on the mountainside was a fatal mistake, and the tragedy was inevitable.
Considering the direction of the wind, on that day the bulk of the snow accumulated on the less-blown south-eastern slope of the mountain, where the tent was installed.
It seems that the situation unfolded as follows.
After an unsuccessful attempt to cross the pass on January 31, 1959 (later it will be called the Dyatlov Pass) and descend to the valley of the 4th tributary of the Lozva river on February 1, 1959 Dyatlov made a decision to go around 880 on the left along the slope of height 1096 (now Mount Kholat Syakhl), and then descend to the named tributary.
However, when crossing the slope of this mountain, the group fell into a strong storm, i.e. in fact, in the absence of visibility, she was unable to correctly orient herself and determine the direction of descent.
Perhaps an attempt to descend to the forest was, but
38.
they stumbled upon stone crests and without having detailed maps, did not dare to continue down the path.
Apparently, Dyatlov made a decision to wait out the bad weather by setting up a tent on the slope, “buried” in the snow, as evidenced by the recent photographs of the participants of the march themselves (pic 9-10).
From the materials of the criminal case, it follows that many local tourists considered such a decision to be correct, referring to their own and others' experience.
However, they were simply lucky or at their time were not chosen to be avalanche-prone places on the mountain slopes.
It seems that the further course of events developed according to the following scenario.
Assuming a cold night, the group members had a dry dinner and lay down (tried to lie down) covered themselves with blankets, removing only their shoes and jackets.
Perhaps two of them put on valenki for the night.
The whole group was located across the tent with their feet to the mountain and heads towards the forest.
The snowstorm continued and after a while the mass of snow on the slope became critical.
The avalanche came down in the form of a slab, weighing at least several tons.
If the avalanche managed to pick up speed, the group members would most likely not be able to get out of the tent.
Initially, the sliding mass of snow was held back for a short time by the tension of the sinking tent.
The first obvious signs of an avalanche at night in the dark most likely caused panic.
The rapidly increasing pressure of the snow did not make it possible not only to take outerwear, but also to leave the tent in an organized manner.
Apparently this process took a few seconds.
The last of those who left the tent were already breaking through the ever increasing mass of snow, which forced the tourists to instinctively rush down the slope in the direction of the intended forest.
This was facilitated by the continuing storm and hurricane wind in the same direction (i.e. blowing in their backs - ed. note).
Major surface damage (surface wounds and abrasions), subsequently found on almost all bodies, could have been received by tourists both while leaving the tent and when overcoming the stone ridge between the slope and the first trees.
Within a few minutes, the start of the downward movement of the group members, taking into account the continuing storm and gale, could not detect the exact location of the tent buried under the snow, and given the high density of snow and the absence of any aids (ice axes, axes, shovels) in such a cold and dig it out.
The only opportunity to try to survive in those conditions for them was an attempt to descend into the forest as quickly as possible, create shelter and provide a warm night before the weather improves.
However, in severe frost, hurricane winds, and the difficulty of moving through deep snow and a stone ridge, it was almost physically impossible to reach the forest (more than 1.5 km from the tent) fast enough.
As follows from the materials of the criminal case, members of the Dyatlov group could accomplish this.
39.
According to many experts, including the St. Petersburg Mountaineers Club, the survival rate in such conditions and in such a state of their clothing is limited to 2-3 hours.
Despite attempts to light a fire under the single cedar tree, the first, most likely, frozen were the worst dressed Y. N. Doroshenko and Y. G. Krivonischenko.
Erroneous but desperate and courageous attempts by I. A. Dyatlova, Z. A. Kolmogorova and R. V. Slobodin to break through the headwind wind to the tent led to death.
Not better by much were the chances of survival of L. A. Dubinina, A. S. Kolevatov, A. A. Zolotaryov and N. V. Thibeaux-Brignolle.
Most likely, they tried, using parts of the clothes of the already dead Y. N. Doroshenko and Y. G. Krivonischenko to go even lower along the slope to the 4th tributary of Lozva and there, digging in the snow, to setup a shelter.
However, a reckless choice of location also led them to death.
The practice has a significant amount of deaths of climbers and tourists as a result of falling into the hollows hidden under the snow.
From the studies of P. P. Zaharov, an honored master of sports in mountaineering, it follows that the direct causes of death when falling into avalanches can be injuries from blows of foreign objects in the avalanche mass, blows of a person in an avalanche on the ground and ridges of rocks, bones, damage to internal organs, deep cooling (freezing), exhaustion, shock and, most often, suffocation (i.e, mechanical asphyxia).
Of particular danger is the collapse of the snow-ice cornice and hidden snow bridges and grottoes, with a fall in the snow-covered crevices and cracks in glaciers and narrow rock falls, especially followed by the collapse of snow-ice masses from above.
In mountaineering, the overcoming of such areas is allowed with the observance of the maximum safety and by being tied with a rope to each other.
Most likely, L. A. Dubinina, A. S. Kolevatov, A. A. Zolotaryov and N. V. Thibeaux-Brignolle tried to settle in a slide not far from the aforementioned single cedar tree, not suspecting that they were above the grotto formed (washed) at the source by the tributary under the snow.
Apparently, the snow and ice bridge collapsed under their weight, and they were covered with a collapsed layer of frozen snow into a hole not less than 5 m deep, which resulted in serious injuries of L. A. Dubinina, A. A. Zolotaryov and N. V. Thibeaux-Brignolle.
Most likely, the death of all four in combination with injuries of the internal organs in three of them could occur both from freezing and from mechanical asphyxiation under the layer of snow falling on top of them.
However, this does not exclude the fact that part of the injuries they received in the process of leaving the tent and overcome the stone ridge.
Based on the above, the circumstances of the deaths of tourists have no hidden motive, and all the questions and doubts that have arisen are the consequences of lack of professionalism and incomplete work on the case.
However, to fill the gaps in the investigation, taking into account past years, there are currently only limited possibilities.
It seems that, given the lack of objective data on the involvement of anyone in the death of members
40. of Dyatlova tourist group, carrying out this work is possible without resuming the investigation - as part of an additional but official preliminary inquiry.
 
ANNEX
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pic 1 On the map is an approximated route of Dyatlov group, according to the expedition plan below
 
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pic 2. Dyatlov group route plan
 
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pic 3. Organization of the search operation
41.
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pic 4. The place where the tent was found
 
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pic. 5 The tent stretched for examination
 
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pic 6. Study of the tent
42.
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pic 7. The place where the tent was found
 
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pic. 8. The footprints found outside of the tent
 
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pic 9. Last photos of the hikers
 
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pic 10. Last photos of the hikers
 
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pic 11 The scheme of events in the photograph from a height of 1096
 
 
 
 
 


#1005 fortyck

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Napisano 15 listopad 2018 - 21:21

Dyatlov Pass in Winter - Scanning Stone Belt Ridge, Dead Mountain and Tent Location

 

 

 

Dyatlov Pass in Winter - Tent Location Ridge to Tree Line

 

 

 

Dyatlov Pass in Winter - Scanning the ridge

 

 

 

 

http://www.dyatlov-pass-incident.com



#1006 fortyck

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Napisano 18 listopad 2018 - 13:09

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Galina Sazonova on Kolevatov

 

 
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Aleksander Sergeevich Kolevatov
Born on Nov. 16, 1934, in Sverdlovsk. 
The 5th or 6 ​children​ (​a girl ​born after him ​died in childhood) and ​he is the ​only boy in the family​.
Sasha​ had poor health ​as kid, ​all his sisters loved him ​very much.
They live​d​ in ​a ​private house​ in the center of Sverdlovsk, his father had a very good position - financial director (главный бухгалтер) of some factories.
The people like his father will have been killed first in 1937.
​His father ​was not, in 1938 he moved to Gulag as a financial director of one of the factories in Tavda.
​The whole family moved to this place too.
May​be​ ​this ​decision save​d​ ​his​ life.
In Gulag, but not prisoner.
Of course he was a member of elite group there, but surroundings of his family changed a lot.
Guardians are different from prisoners only because the​y​ can kill.
Prisoners can be killed.
Sasha didn't go to school, his elder sister Rimma took care about him.
She will ​become a famous teacher in ​the ​future, developing a special education programs for kids with behavior problems.
1941 - war started.
Th​e camp in​ the​ Gulag where Kolevatovs stay became on of the first camp​s​ for German​s and one of the most horrible ​ones.
But it still "ok" for Kolevatov's family if it possible to say "ok" in this situation.
At least they had food enough ​to​ survive.
Suddenly everything crashed​.
His father was found dead on the railway line killed by a train.
No investigation of his death has been done.
What did ​this​ mean for ​his ​family?
They lost everything. ​
The three​ elder sister​s​ ​had already left Tavda but Sasha, Rimma and ​their ​mother ​remained in the camp.
They lost social position immediately, but more ​importantly ​-​ there was no more​ food.
The m​other was sick and couldn't work.
All of them ​rely​​​ on ​​food ​coupons: 200​ ​g ​bread ​per day per person, 1​.2 kg of fish or meat per month per person, 1-2 kg of grain per month which can be change for potato during winter season.
They went to a hell. Sasha was almost 10 years old.
How did he survived this situation?
​Only after the war ended they ​all ​ca​me​ back to Sverdlovsk.
Rimma has been admitted to ​work as a teacher in ​the ​primary school​ where ​Sasha went.
All of them shared one small room in the institute campus which Rimma got as a student.
They were very poor.
Sasha ​didn't have good grades.
He had high score in German language only.
​How come he ​knew German​ and English well?
No idea.
May be he communicated with a German pr​i​son​e​rs in ​the ​Gulag.
He graduated secondary school (grade 7) and went to ​college.
College provided not only professional skills, but uniform and additional food card.
He didn't study well​ the​ 1st and 2nd year. ​
And then suddenly something changed ​in him - ​he ​joined ​the Komsomol and improved all his ​studies and grades.
Education in the USSR was free of charge, but each graduate was required to work for 3 years after graduation in nominated place.
Someone decided to send him ​t​o Moscow to work in the secret institute of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building.
This decision was made almost a year before the graduation ​from college.​
We know that six months before the graduation, he had already passed a security check in Moscow and was approved.
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Kolevatov security questionnaire begining
 
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... and the end with the date underlined
Ordinary boy from ordinary ​college with ordinary performance.
Someone recommended​, protected ​and advised him.
First advice was to immediately join the Komosol - Young Communist League. ​
I​t was the final stage of three youth organizations with members up to age 28, graduated at age 14 from the Young Pioneers.
You couldn't join the Kommunist Party without passing all the stages.
You couldn't make a career without being a communist.
All members of Dyatlov's group joined Komsomol at age 14, as soon as it was allowed.
Sasha ​- ​at age 18, during passing a security check "in the secret institute".
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Kolevatov residence in Moscow
What do we know about his life in Moscow?
  • His salary was about 900-1000 rubles per month, while the average wage in the USSR was 600-700 rubles, the scholarship - 250-350 rubles per month.
  • He got free housing in a new building which well-known scientists also lived. Moscow was a closed city and no one could come to live there.

 

Where Kolevatov lived is today one of the most prestigious areas of Moscow with very expensive apartments.
He worked very well, and was very active in the social life of the institute.
He became a member of Institute Komsomol committee, leaded shooting sport section.
Began to engage in tourism, made new friends.
Duality and different assessment of his job position.​
Of course he has not been a "leading scientist", but for the 19 year old boy who just graduated ordinary college he had a very good position and he was involved to some scientific research.
Did he ​have access to classified information?
Was he a "secret keeper" working in Secret Institute?
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Sablya (Sabre, Cабля), Pre-Polar Ural
Sasha hiked the mount Sablya (Sabre, Cабля), Pre-Polar Ural, as a member of a Moscow group.
This is a difficult trek.
I was just interested in finding information about this hike.
Everything was structured in USSR and I was trying to find the club that could organize this trek.
I couldn't.
Then I thought - there is no information about ordinary groups, maybe it was not an ordinary one?
May be it was a group of "secret keepers" who had restrictions on contacts and did not belong to any ordinary sports organization?
I began to look for memories of the tourism of people who belonged to this category. 
Bingo!
I was right!
I found the memories of a scientist about how they wanted to be engaged in tourism and then the director of a secret organisation helped them organize a tourist section which has been out of ordinary tourists clubs.
The director who support ​the​is tourism was Dmitriy Ivanovich Blohincev - soviet physicist, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences (1934).
Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1958) and the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (1939).
Professor of Moscow State University (1936).
Hero of Socialist Labor (1956). Winner of the Lenin (1957), Stalin (1952) and State (1971) awards.
One of the founders and director of the IPPE (1947-1956) and JINR (1956-1965).
Member of the Bureau of the Department of Nuclear Physics, USSR Academy of Sciences (1971-1979).
President of IUPAP (1966-1969).
Member of the Higher Attestation Commission at the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
Advisor to the Scientific Council under the UN Secretary-General (since 1967).
I changed direction of my research a finally found the leader of that group.
All members of the group worked in secret nuclear Institutes.
Two of them (including the​ ​leader) were "children to their fathers​": The father of leader is... Blohincev Dmitiy Ivanovich
The father of second one - Anatoly Alexandrov It was a ​top of the very closed scientific secret elite, and Sasha was accepted.
Duality.
Why did he leave Moscow​?​
Read Alexei Rakitin's version on Kolevatov's decision to leave Moscow and transfer back to Sverdlovsk.
Dyatlov group seem to have celebrated Aleksander Kolevatov's birthday on Jan 30 - his present was a tangerine, which he readily distributed among his friends.
This is taking place 2 days before they all perish in the treacherous Ural mountain in 1959.
He was 24 years old when he died.
Kolevatov is buried on May 12, 1959, in Mihaylovskoe cemetery, Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Russia.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Żródło: https://www.facebook.com/dyatlovmania/



#1007 fortyck

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Napisano 18 listopad 2018 - 13:12

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Rakitin’s version on Kolevatov
All rights belong to Alexei Rakitin , from “Death is never far behind...”
 
Aleksander Kolevatov remains a “dark horse”, nothing stands out abouthim.
At first glance, an ordinary 4th year student of the Physics and Technology Department of UPI, his family goes back many generation in Urals, like some other members of the group (except Semyon Zolotaryov, Georgy Krivonischenko, Rustem Slobodin and Yuri Doroshenko).
He is unlikely candidate to be recruited by KGB, it was equally possible to suspect any other participant of the campaign - both Yuri Doroshenko and Igor Dyatlov...
However, the assessment of this person immediately becomes ambiguous after reading the documents found by Alexei Vladimirovich Koskin on Aleksander Kolevatov - his character reference and statement of admission to the Sverdlovsk Polytech in 2nd course.
This seemingly small discovery allows you to look at the life of Aleksander Kolevatov in a completely new way.
What do we see?
In 1953, a 19-year-old young man graduated from the Mining and Metallurgical College in Sverdlovsk and was sent to Moscow.
And not just in Moscow, but in one of the most secret research institutions of the USSR, created as part of the implementation of the "uranium project".
We are talking about the so-called organized in May 1946 as part of the 9th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR laboratory "B", focused on creating protection against ionizing radiation.
This laboratory, which grew literally within a year to the size of the institute, was located first in Chelyabinsk, and after 1949 moved to Chelyabinsk-40 ... yes, that very “atomic city” where Georgiy Krivonischenko worked a little later and where September 1957, one of the world's largest atomic man-made disasters occurred.
In January 1953, this nameless "number" institute (PO Box No. 3394) was transferred to Moscow, where over time it was transferred to the Ministry of Medium Machine Building and assigned the name All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Inorganic Materials (the renaming took place in January 1967).
From the very moment of its creation, Aleksander Konstantinovich Uralets-Ketov headed this worthy institution, his signature flaunts the description of Aleksander Kolevatov, which was mentioned a little higher.
Aleksander Konstantinovich is very interesting to us because his biography allows us to very visually demonstrate the close relationship between the state security bodies and the military industry supervised by these bodies.
Born in 1902, Ketov (Uralets is a pseudonym taken back in the years of the Civil War) successfully made a career in the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-MGB up to 1953.
Starting his career in Perm Cheka in 1920, he was by April 1944 the city was promoted to Colonel of State Security, deputy chief of the Tagil Forced Labor Camp of the NKVD.
At the front, the comrade Colonel of State Security did not serve, he endured all the dangerous years in warm places in the deep rear, more and more in the environs of Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk and Nizhniy Tagil.
By the way, this did not prevent his successful career.
In May 1946, the career of a colonel made an unexpected somersault: Pavel Yakolevich Meshik, deputy head of the Main Directorate at SNK, engaged in the development of atomic weapons, attracted Ural-Ketov to participate in the Soviet "atomic project".
And the colonel, without any technical education, became the head of a special laboratory, which later grew into a secret institute.
Aleksander Konstantinovich in a certain way touched upon the events connected with the notorious “denunciation of Beria’s group”, since Meshik was in this group, was arrested and was put on trial.
The court in December 1953 handed down the death sentence to Lieutenant General Meshik, and Uralets-Ketov remained out of business for some time.
They looked at him as a Beria protégé, promoted by one of Beria's henchmen, and for some time were removed from the leadership of the institute.
In 1953, the colonel was dismissed from the MGB system, for more than two years he was considered to be in the "existing reserve", and in October 1955 he was also removed from there.
In the end, he was able to prove that he was not a Beria protégé, and returned to the institute, which he headed for more than 20 years.
Such an interesting career - from the leaders of the Gulag to the ranks of the foremost technical intelligentsia, in a sense, the technocratic elite of society.
It was very, very difficult to get a job in Moscow in the early 50s.
The capital provided its residents with the maximum possible amenities - a well-organized supply of grocery and industrial goods, a stable urban transport, public order, and exemplary utility services.
Here were the best theaters and the most interesting art exhibitions, literary novelties appeared here, the intellectual color of the Soviet society worked here.
It is no coincidence that Aleksander Tvardovskiy wrote about Moscow in those years: “they are rewarding with the capital”.
The propiska system worked in such a way that it cut off everyone who came to look for work on their own.
Only Muscovites received work in Moscow, and finding a job for a nonresident resident in the capital meant pulling out a winning lottery ticket.
The situation of those years related to getting a job in Moscow was described very well by Army General, First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, Philip Denisovich Bobkov in his momoirs.
In 1946, he graduated from the SMERSH school in Leningrad, located on Gorokhovaya Street, Building 2, and received a referral... to Moscow.
Bobkov was originally from the south of Russia, from Makeyevka, a large center of the coal industry.
He was, however, sent to Moscow, and this happened because of an anecdotal error: the secretary of the personnel department read the carelessly written word "Makeyevka" as "Moscow" and put the personal file of cadet Bobkov in a pile of "Muscovites".
When the technical error was clarified, it was too late to correct the situation - the list of Muscovite cadets went "ordered" by the Minister of State Security.
No one ventured to call Moscow and honestly say "we made a mistake".
As you know, Viktor Abakumov could have killed with a word (such historical legends are known), therefore, telling the minister that he had signed an incorrectly drafted order was concidered a suicide.
In the end, Bobkov came to Moscow, where, by the way, in 1955 he interrogated some of the parachutists caught by Boris Pasha.
In general, the very informative memoirs of F. D. Bobkov “The KGB and the authorities” can be recommended for attentive reading to all those who are interested in national history in general and the history of domestic special services in particular.
We will return to the lucky lottery ticket called "Moscow pass".
Aleksander Kolevatov pulled out such a ticket.
A graduate of a quite ordinary mining and metallurgical college from distant provincial Sverdlovsk managed to get to Moscow, to a secret scientific research institute.
In principle, a very good start in life is a stable job with a 15% surcharge for secrecy, a residence permit in the capital, a place in a hostel, a feeling of belonging to a great public matter (which is very important for a young man).
Aleksander was surrounded by interesting people; he turned out to be involved in the most advanced scientific search in the world (albeit as a senior laboratory assistant); he found time for leisure and hobbies - was engaged in target shooting, went on tourist trips.
During his "Moscow period" of life, Kolevatov visited Mount Saber in the Subpolar Urals, about 300 km. north of Otorten.
He was not drafted into the army, since work at the defense research institute provided Aleksander with an "armor".
In general, not a bad start in life, not bad at all.
As a senior laboratory assistant, Aleksander Kolevatov worked as juniour specialist for 3 years - from August 1953 to September 1956.
In 1955 he entered the All-Union Correspondence Polytechnic Institute (ACPI).
The purpose of admission is obvious - getting higher education with no mush sweat.
Correspondence education in Soviet times was considered a “freebie”, since the load on full-time students was much higher.
The "correspondence students" were, as a rule, non-resident people, had work experience, were often burdened with families, and the teachers treated them with a certain degree of condescension.
Meanwhile, the diplomas of correspondence and full-time studies were no different and the diploma obtained after the end of the full-time department did not give any privileges to its owner.
For Aleksander Kolevatov, training at the ACPI was a real gift - he continued to work quietly in the Moscow "mailbox", enjoyed paid vacations for the sessional period and, without burdening himself with his studies, could wait until he had become the owner of the cherished blue book with embossed inscription "Diploma".
However, after the end of the first course in the All-Union Correspondence "Polytech", something strange and illogical happened in the life of Kolevatov - Aleksander suddenly decided to change the institute.
And not just the institute, but also the form of education - instead of correspondence, to become full-time student.
And therefore, quit work.
And since he decided to study at the Sverdlovsk UPI, he also had to change his place of residence: abandoning Moscow, returning to Sverdlovsk.
This decision is completely inexplicable and at a lost from all points of view.
Drawing parallels with the modern way of life, we can say that the person abandoned a career in "Toyota" and returned from Tokyo in order to pool weeds in a dacha in his native Uryupinsk.
Not that Uryupinsk is a bad place by itslef, but life prospects there can't compare with those in Tokyo.
It is naive to think that young people in the mid-50s of the last century were not pragmatic and didn't have common sense.
And let the cinema and literature of those years diligently paint in front of us images of such fanatic members of the Komsomol with a glowing look of astonishment, in fact the youth of that time was far from one-dimensional.
In the remarkable and very informative work "Unknown USSR: the opposition of the people and the authorities" one can find a deep analysis of the state of the youth environment of those years.
There was a place for both the criminal subculture, and chauvinism, and oriental romance, and political skepticism - in general, the life position of the youth of those years was determined by the impact of this cocktail of conflicting (and sometimes incompatible) feelings and emotions.
There was a place at that time for youth gangs and groups organized according to the principle of territorial or national community; there was a spontaneous hatred against "cops and the party", the mention of which we will not find in the pathetic novels and films of those years.
The youth in the army was the most distinguished mansion, and many of the riots of that time were directly connected with the actions of either the soldiers or the mobilized youth (not to be confused with the current hazing!).
In general, V. A. Kozlov’s book "Unknown USSR: Opposition of People and Authorities" 1953-1985, Moscow, OLMA-PRESS, 2006, can be recommended for reading to anyone who is interested in forming an objective understanding of the Soviet society in "Khrushchev" times, to feel the dissatisfaction from the apparent one-sidedness of the official historical doctrine.
In the context of the theme of our essay, we would like to note that Aleksander Kolevatov was certainly not an elf who came to the Khrushchev USSR from a magical forest.
There is no doubt about his pragmatism and the ability to see his own profit.
This makes his move from Moscow to Sverdlovsk even stranger.
This move did not solve any problems, only created new ones.
Kolevatov was losing his job and, accordingly, he faced the task of replacing the money that had fallen out of his personal budget.
Instead of a measured study in the correspondence university, which required tension only for the duration of the sessions (moreover, at that time he received paid leave at his place of work!), Kolevatov had to adapt to a completely different schedule, much more intense.
Of course, having become a full-time student, he received all the bonuses that adorn student life at all times, but still this can not be the cost to have some fun.
And most importantly, Kolevatov changed the Moscow residence permit to Sverdlovsk, and in those days it was a completely unequal replacement.
Moving to Sverdlovsk could be explained by dismissal from work, they say, having lost a source of income, Aleksander decided to return to his homeland.
But we know that the order of events was reversed - Kolevatov was first transferred from the correspondence “Polytech” to Sverdlovsk and only then was dismissed.
Moreover, the reason for the dismissal was just “going to study at the university”, i.e. at UPI, because study at the All-Union Correspondence Polytech did not interfere with work.
Why do this?
This suggests a clear analogy with the situation that we saw in the case of Semyon Zolotaryov, i.e. the man moved to the Urals from a much more prosperous region.
A person decides to take such a step not at all because of altruism, no one in the USSR refused to go to Moscow residence only in order to be closer to his girlfriend or his sick mother.
For such a step, not only very strong reasons were required, but permanent bases, i.e. such, the action of which will persist for many years.
Just these bases can not always be seen or correctly interpreted by others.
Obviously, studying at the Sverdlovsk "Polytechnic" gave Kolevatov some serious advantages that it was impossible to get in the ACPI.
What could that be?
First of all, in the Sverdlovsk "Polytechnic" there was a military department, training on which allowed graduates to receive the title of reserve officer.
Correspondence form of education in ACPI did not provide for such a possibility.
The presence of the officer’s rank served as a guarantee against being called up for active military service as soldier.
However, in order to work at the Moscow Institute, Kolevatov did not really need this rank — the Minsredmash Research Institute could provide him with a deferment (this provision was not generally accepted at that time and, moreover, it was necessary to extend the delay every year until the onset of old age).
But the unusual situation of Kolevatov was that it was good for him to be called up for active military service from Moscow - his job was guaranteed on his return and in addition he would have been restored not as a juniour specialist with a temporary residence permit in Moscow, but a permanent worker.
With the provision of living space.
Thus Aleksander Kolevatov could turn into a 100% Muscovite and at the same time safely get an engineering degree, having graduated from the All-Union Correspondence “Polytechnic”.
However, this option definitely did not suit him.
There is no doubt that Aleksander had a different plan for his life.
And this plan definitely call for getting a rank of reserve officer.
As is known, after the massacre of Beria and the "Beria gang", Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev and his associates decided on a full-scale reform of the USSR state security system.
The demolition was cardinal and was carried out in several directions at the same time.
The KGB of the USSR, created on March 13, 1954, was very different from the state security apparatus created in the post-war years.
And, for the better.
The methods of work became much more civilized and humane.
As early as September 1953 Bureau №2 of Special Operations inside the country disappeared and never again appeared.
For the first time in the history of the Soviet state security operational work was organizationally combined with counterintelligence (in the framework of the Second Main Directorate), etc.
But the most significant was the change in the requirements for the personnel of the special services.
Khrushchev can hardly be called a technocrat, but for all its apparent simplicity, he was very respectful of people who had a technical education.
One of his sons was a pilot, the other worked in the rocket design bureau, which on its own says a lot.
After the arrest of Beria in the state security organs, a large purge was carried out, a large number of experienced workers either retire, were transferred to work at the police, or lost party membership and military ranks.
The total number of dismissed reached, according to various estimates, 16 thousand people, among them more than 40 generals.
Beginning in 1954, they were replaced by young employees of the new formation - not just young, healthy and dedicated to the party, but also with higher education.
For the security officers of the previous period, it was the norm for an employee without any special education to be engaged in operational work for a long time.
From the second half of the 50s, the requirement of having a higher education, which, by the way, persisted until the collapse of the USSR in 1991, became a requirement.
Graduates of technical universities (civil or military) were preferred, from the humanitarian disciplines the KGB were mainly lawyers.
A big plus for the candidates was knowledge of foreign languages, as well as sporting achievements, primarily in strength sports (wrestling, boxing, weightlifting) and shooting.
The logic of the Khrushchev reforms was clear: why take an ignoramus to the authorities and for several years try to make him an educated person, if you can initially select only literate people?
Many KGB employees of the “Khrushchev generation” made a good career in state security, rising to the Perestroika and even the collapse of the USSR.
For many years their human qualities determined the style of work of this department, which favorably differed from the mayhem that could be seen in the Stalin era.
After graduating from a military or civil university, a young officer who had already received an officer’s rank enrolled to the Committee was sent to receive one-year Higher Training Courses for operational personnel that existed in Leningrad, Minsk, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, Tashkent and Tbilisi (border guards and intelligence officers had their educational institutions).
Higher Red Banner School of the KGB.
Dzerzhinsky in Moscow was focused on training the Committee’s personnel from among those who had served in active military service and did not have an officer’s rank (including warrant officers).
The Moscow Research Institute, in which Aleksander Kolevatov worked as a senior laboratory assistant, was permeated by KGB officers or by the Committee’s agents.
The practice of seconding state security staff to government agencies and industrial enterprises began in the late 1920s last century, with the end of the NEP (New Economic Policy).
In the staffing of any more or less serious organization, there were positions intended to be replaced either by state security staff members or by the existing reserve staff (for us, the difference between them is irrelevant).
In this case, the entire institute was headed by a colonel of state security with more than 30 years of experience, one might say, a veteran of the Cheka.
And besides the obvious "KGBists", there were agent networks (so-called "lines") in important defense enterprises, scientific research institutes and institutions of strategic industries, similar to those described above.
Only they were created and supervised not by the secret-operational part of the local administration of the GB (State Security), but by the counterintelligence unit of the same department (although, recall that since March 18, 1954, the secret-operational and counterintelligence support were organizationally combined in general units).
There is no doubt that Kolevatov was well known to the curators from the enterprise mode service and, moreover, he was known from the best side (according to the character reference).
Kolevatov obviously wanted to make a career in the field in which he worked - that is why he entered the All-Union Correspondence “Polytechnic”.
But then he received a more tempting offer - young, healthy, sports Komsomol members were so necessary to the State Security Committee!
Aleksander Kolevatov is an excellent athlete, a tourist, a member of the Komsomol bureau of the unit, leads the rifle section, has the third adult level in shooting.
Well, the rank, we suppose, is not the highest, but the Committee will learn ...!
Until now, we’ll measure the hardness of vanadium alloys according to Rockwell and Brinel, or maybe there is a desire to do another, more responsible assignment?
”They could have asked Aleksander during a talk in the office of the deputy director for the regime.
And Kolevatov did not reject the proposal, because no one would have refused in his place.
Such a proposal was prestigious, it testified to the complete trust of the management and promised an enchanting life perspective for the Ural chap.
But a correspondence student in “polytechnic” was not suitable for such a career.
He needed a full-time form of training - with the military department and shoulder straps of the reserve officer at the end.
Therefore, there was this very intriguing transfer to Sverdlovsk, in the UPI.
Why intriguing?
Because in the USSR it was not customary to transfer from correspondence education to full-time (on the contrary - easily, but from correspondence education - you get tired of asking, it was easier to quit and re-enter).
Why? - an interested reader will ask, accustomed to the commodity-money relations of the last decades and unable to understand all the intricacies of the administration of a high school that has long since disappeared from the state.
There were two reasons for this: firstly, the already mentioned difference in part-time and full-time education programs, the very “tardiness” of correspondence students, of which the teachers were well aware.
And secondly, full-time education, as opposed to correspondence education, gave a “armor” from the army, a deferment, and a person who wanted to make such a transition was considered someone that wants to avoid drafting in the army.
If the institute received a request for such a transfer, then the reaction: “Another smartypants wants to run away from the army!
Admitted as correspondence student, and when it came time to carry the "ninth" form in the draft board, decided quickly top transfer to full-time!
No, no, no, let him pull a soldier's strap like everybody else!"
Kolevatov would never have transferred from the All-Union Correspondence to the full-time department of the Sverdlovsk Polytech if someone powerful would not have asked for it in secret.
Kolevatov was transferred, which means that there was a convincing request.
There is a very interesting nuance in this transfer - it lies in the fact that the programs of different institutions are somewhat different.
And although the first course in any technical university is always basic, designed to compensate for the flaws of school, even its programs in technical universities differ.
Not to mention the fact that even within the framework of the same course, the requirements of teachers could be different as well.
In general, the transfer from the All-Union Correspondence “Polytechnic” to the full-time department of the Sverdlovsk UPI was not impossible, but difficult to implement in reality.
Kolevatov, however, managed to transfer successfully.
It is clear why Aleksander was transferred to UPI.
Firstly, he returned to his native home, which facilitated household arrangements, and secondly, the Sverdlovsk "Polytechnic Institute" trained specialists to work at nuclear facilities in the Urals and Siberia.
While studying at UPI, Kolevatov had the opportunity to meet many of his future colleagues in an informal setting, which increased his value as a future counterintelligence officer.
There is another very interesting point to our attention.
Aleksander Kolevatov had a Finnish knife with a black handle and leather sheath.
In principle, it was impossible to surprise anyone with this kind of knives at that time, camp craftsmen were sharpening similar products from saws and files, with the popular “makeshift” handles from plexiglass or textolite rings (such knives immortalized Vladimir Vysotsky in his song)
Neither dare nor risk, but took the risk // Make knives from files! // They will stick into lungs // Black nicotine, // Tri-color dials // Light handles (...) ").
But Kolevatov had a Finnish knife was registered at the police station, and he had a permit to carry it.
For those times unprecedented law-abiding!
Especially if we take into account that every second student of a FZU (middle professional technical school) in those years either had a screwdriver, an awl, or a file in the pocket of the quilted jacket, and with the onset of twilight youth gangs controlled entire urban areas.
There can be only one explanation for this: Kolevatov did not want a single black spot in his biography, which even a trivial drive to the police for illegal possession of cold weapons with the registration of the relevant protocol could become.
Such attention to the purity of the biography can be demonstrated only by a person who associates with great formal life prospects the formal impeccability of the questionnaire.
A drive to the police could not serve as a basis for expulsion from the institute or from the military department, in other words, this kind of problem could not interfere with the engineering career of Aleksander Kolevatov.
Nobody would put him in jail, he wouldn’t deprive him of freedom, well, they would reproach him at a Komsomol meeting, would have reprimanded him (not even a reprimand) - that's all! Basically, no big deal.
However, a single drive to the police could be enough to deny admission to the KGB.
If Aleksander in 1957 really got into the personnel reserve of the Committee and he was promised admission to the special service after the end of "Polytech", then he was also told about the need to completely eliminate any, even the most minor, violations of the law.
Observing this requirement, Aleksander went to register his knife at the police station.
Summarizing all the above, I would like to note: we cannot assert with absolute confidence that Aleksander was firmly associated with the Committee, however, the high probability of that is evident from the unusual circumstances of his life.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Żródło: https://www.facebook.com/dyatlovmania/



#1008 fortyck

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Napisano 21 listopad 2018 - 21:36



#1009 fortyck

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Napisano 24 listopad 2018 - 23:33

В 3 километрах на запад от перевала Дятлова находится ударный кратер большого размера.

 

Он образован ядерным взрывом или падением метеорита.

 

Координаты 61.763490°, 59.408397°

 



#1010 fortyck

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Napisano 27 listopad 2018 - 21:06

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#1011 fortyck

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Napisano 30 listopad 2018 - 21:36

Еще одна тайна перевала Дятлова: обнаружены следы загадочного аэродрома

 

 

Радиолюбитель Валентин Дегтерев, который ведет собственное расследование трагедии, произошедшей на перевале Дятлова, нашел следы загадочного аэродрома.

 

Дегтерев пишет в своем блоге, что, по мнению главного исследователя загадки перевала Юрия Кунцевича, аэродром построили немцы, его в годы войны готовили к оккупации и бомбардировкам Урала.

 

"Мне удалось найти следы этого загадочного аэродрома.

 

Он находится на склоне горы, в 46 километрах на северо-восток от перевала Дятлова.

 

Это если идти на перевал со стороны Перми.

 

В свободном доступе есть его спутниковая фотография на сайте Google Earth.

 

Координаты заброшенного аэродрома такие: 62.172418°, 59.429707°", — пишет исследователь. 

 

По его словам, сохранилась взлетно-посадочная полоса длиной порядка 100 метров, шириной 7 метров.

 

"Раньше она была длинней, но сейчас ее "разрезало" на две части.

 

Есть также останки посадочного знака (если я не ошибаюсь).

 

Даже какой-то разбитый ангар рядом с полосой.

 

Каких-то других останков зданий там не видно. Но сама полоса явно бетонированная", — говорится в сообщении, размещенном в блоге Дегтерева. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Żródło: http://ren.tv/novost...hnogo-aerodroma



#1012 fortyck

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Napisano 03 grudzień 2018 - 21:18

Тайна перевала Дятлова: кто похоронен в могиле Семёна Золотарёва

 

 

Журналисты "Комсомольской правды" провели эксгумацию одного из самых загадочных участников группы Дятлова и тем самым опровергли самые невероятные версии, связанные с ним.

 

 

Присылайте свои видео на reporter@kp.ru

 

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#1013 fortyck

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Napisano 06 grudzień 2018 - 21:42

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#1014 fortyck

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Napisano 09 grudzień 2018 - 21:45

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#1015 fortyck

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Napisano 12 grudzień 2018 - 21:36

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